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Abstract
Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify
some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage
enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-
theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges
want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions
programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.
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Applying to college is an increasingly anxious and high-stakes process for many American
families. Admission at the nation￿ s elite universities has become extraordinarily competitive.
In 2007-08, Harvard and Yale￿ s acceptance rates reached record lows of 7.1 and 8.3 percent,
respectively, and Stanford, Princeton and Columbia all admitted fewer than one in ten
applicants. Just a decade ago, acceptance rates at these schools were ￿fty percent higher.1
At the same time, a large number of Americans have come to view admission to an elite
university as a ticket to future success.2 Not surprisingly these developments have focused
enormous attention on the college admissions process.
We focus in this paper on a particular aspect of the process, the use of early admissions
programs by selective schools. Though versions of early admissions have been used for many
years, these programs have become ubiquitous in the last two decades. Over two-thirds of
top colleges o⁄er some form of early admissions, and many schools ￿ll a sizeable fraction of
their entering class with early applicants. Schools primarily use one of two types of early
admissions programs: Early Action programs where students are accepted well before the
standard March announcement date, but are not committed to enroll, and Early Decision
programs where students commit to enroll if accepted.
Participants in the market tend to focus on the relatively high rates of admission for early
applicants. In 2007-08, for instance, Yale admitted 16.7 percent of its early applicants and
Stanford 18.1 percent, about twice the rate for the regular pool. As we discuss below, some
of the di⁄erence can be attributed to systematic di⁄erences between the early and regular
pools of applicants, but applying early does appear to convey a signi￿cant advantage. In part
because this bene￿t tends to be captured by students who are both well-o⁄and well-informed,
some prominent academic leaders have argued that early admissions should be curtailed.
This has led to some notable recent developments. In 2003-04, Yale and Stanford switched
from Early Decision to Early Action, and in 2007-08, Harvard and Princeton eliminated
early admission entirely. The attention generated by these changes underscores the perceived
1Admission rates in 2007-08 were Stanford 9.5%, Princeton 9.2%, Columbia 8.7%. In 1997-98, admission
rates were: Harvard 12.3%, Yale 16.8%, Princeton 13.1%, Stanford 13% and Columbia 14.2%. These changes
have been much remarked on; see for example ￿Elite Colleges Reporting Record Lows in Admissions,￿New
York Times, April 1, 2008.
2As just one example, Ramey and Ramey (2008) argue that since the 1990s competition to secure slots
for their children at selective colleges has led college-educated parents to substantially reallocate their time
toward childcare.
1importance of early admissions.
The current situation raises questions about why schools are drawn to use early admis-
sions, how the programs operate, and what e⁄ects they have. We start in this paper by
describing a collection of empirical patterns drawn from data on high school seniors apply-
ing to college. The ￿ndings dovetail with those reported in Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser
(2003), and include the following.
First, early applicants at top schools are stronger than regular applicants in their numer-
ical quali￿cations, but the reverse is true at lower-ranked schools. Second, admission rates
of early applicants are higher than those of regular applicants, and this remains true after
conditioning on students￿observable characteristics. Early application is associated with a
20 to 30 percentage point increase in acceptance probability, about the same as 100 addi-
tional points on the SAT. Third, an admissions bene￿t provides an incentive for students
to strategize: to apply early even if they are undecided about their preferences, or to apply
early to a school that is not their absolute ￿rst choice. Fourth, students who are admitted
early are more likely to enroll than students who are admitted through regular admissions.
Fifth, the type of early admission program varies with school characteristics: non-binding
Early Action is o⁄ered disproportionately by the highest ranked universities.
These patterns can be understood in the context of a simple economic model in which
early application programs create an opportunity for applicants to signal their preferences.
To capture this idea, we consider a setting in which colleges value academic talent but also
want to attract students who are good matches and will take advantage of the school￿ s par-
ticular strengths. Colleges view an early application as a signal of interest and therefore favor
these applicants in their admissions decisions. The admissions advantage gives students an
incentive to apply early ￿ generally, though not always, to their preferred school. Together,
these incentives create an equilibrium dynamic in which an early application credibly signals
interest and early applicants enjoy favorable admissions. Moreover, the schools prefer the
equilibrium outcome under early admissions to the outcome that is achieved if there are no
early applications. The reason is that early admissions leads to a ￿ner sorting of students
than is possible with regular admissions only.
The logic we have described applies with non-binding early action programs. We also
consider the binding early decision programs that are the norm outside of the top ten uni-
versities. Early decision leads to a similar equilibrium dynamic, but with di⁄erent welfare
2consequences. Notably a lower ranked school can bene￿t from early decision not just be-
cause of the sorting e⁄ect but because it conveys a competitive bene￿t. With early decision,
a lower-ranked school can capture some highly-quali￿ed students who are unsure about their
ability at the time of application. As a result, a highly-ranked school may prefer a situation
where all schools eliminate their early programs. We also show that this model can help to
explain how a school such as Harvard could eliminate its early admissions program without
incurring large costs.
The signaling aspect of early admissions is likely just one of several reasons why colleges
have adopted early admissions. We view it as interesting because, as we show, it can explain
on its own all of the empirical patterns mentioned above, in particular sorting and strategizing
in application behavior, a lower admissions threshold for early applicants, and the use of
early action primarily at high-ranked schools. The last section of the paper discusses some
additional aspects of early admissions that are not captured in our model, such as the
interaction with ￿nancial aid policies and the desire of some schools to engage in forms of
yield management.
2 Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
2.1 Background
Prior to the increase in college applications following World War II, colleges admitted vir-
tually all quali￿ed applicants. Starting in the 1950s, admission became more competitive
and elite schools began to adopt various forms of early admissions, initially motivated by an
attempt to limit uncertainty about class size. Many schools relied heavily on these programs.
Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser (henceforth, AFZ) give the example of Amherst College,
which by 1965 was accepting the majority of its class Early Decision and continued to do so
until 1978 when it decided to limit early admissions to one-third of its entering class.
As initially implemented at the Ivy schools, early application did not actually lead to
early admission. Instead the school provided an early indication of a student￿ s chances. At
Harvard, Yale and Princeton, students were graded on an A-B-C basis, with A meaning the
student was virtually ensured admission. The Ivies and MIT adopted modern early admission
programs in the fall of 1976. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, MIT and Brown introduced non-
3binding Early Action programs while the remaining schools adopted Early Decision.3
The early admission programs o⁄ered by the Ivy schools started small and typically
attracted a select set of applicants. This began to change in the late-1980s and 1990s
as students perceived an admissions advantage from applying early. The number of early
action applications at Harvard, which had hovered below two thousand since the program
was introduced, doubled to almost four thousand between 1990 and 1995 and continued to
increase after that. Meanwhile the number of students Harvard admitted early climbed from
under ￿ve hundred to over a thousand, meaning that around half of Harvard￿ s admitted
students and an even higher percentage of those enrolling at Harvard came from the early
pool (AFZ, 2003).
As reliance on early admissions increased, more and more schools signed on, typically
favoring the more restrictive Early Decision approach. More than a hundred colleges adopted
some form of early admissions program in the 1990s (AFZ, 2003). These developments
ushered in the current environment where the vast majority of elite institutions o⁄er early
admissions. Thirty of the thirty-eight universities deemed ￿most selective￿by U.S. News
and World Report currently o⁄er some form of early admissions, including twenty-one that
o⁄er Early Decision.4 The situation is even more dramatic at selective liberal art colleges,
where twenty-four of the twenty-￿ve most selective o⁄er Early Decision, and the remaining
school (Colorado College) o⁄ers Early Action.
Public discussion in the last decade, however, has led to several important changes. In
December 2001, Yale President Richard Levin suggested in an interview with the New York
Times that early admissions was not bene￿ting students, and that Yale would consider
eliminating it if peer institutions did the same.5 The following year Yale announced that
it would switch to Early Action (it had used Early Decision since 1995) and was followed
immediately by Stanford. Then, in a surprise move, Harvard and Princeton were the ￿rst
elite schools to entirely eliminate their early admissions programs in 2007-08. This means
3With the exception of two periods (1976-1979 and 1999-2003), Ivy League colleges o⁄ering Early Action
programs have used a ￿Single-Choice Early Action￿rule, where early applicants are not allowed to apply
early to any other college.
4Of the schools with no early programs, ￿ve are public institutions (four schools in the UC system and
Michigan).
5￿Yale President Wants to End Early Decisions For Admissions,￿by Karen Arenson, New York Times,
December 13, 2001. In discussing whether Yale would eliminate its program (at the time Early Decision),
Levin noted the aspect of competition, saying that if Yale were to move unilaterally it ￿would be seriously
disadvantaged relative to other schools.￿
4that of the six schools ranked highest by US News, two now eschew early admissions and
the remaining four o⁄er non-binding early action.6 We return to these developments below
as they relate to our analysis.
2.2 Evidence on Early Admissions
This section identi￿es a set of stylized facts that we attempt to explain in our theoretical
model. These are based on data from the ￿College Admissions Project,￿a survey of high
school seniors who provided information about their college applications and ￿nancial aid
packages during the 1999-2000 academic year.7 Counselors from 510 prominent high schools
around the United States selected ten students at random from the top of their senior
classes as measured by grade point average. The surveys asked each participant to provide
quantitative information from the Common Application, now accepted at many colleges, and
supplemental information about their results and decisions. The survey produced a response
rate of approximately 65%, including information for 3,294 students from 396 high schools.
One caveat is that the participants in the survey data have been selected because they placed
at the top of the class at a well-known high school, so that results from the survey only apply
to a subset of possible applicants, those most likely to be admitted to very selective colleges.
We analyze the aggregated data for the set of 28 colleges that received early applications
from more than ten survey participants. Table 1 lists these colleges along with summary
statistics. Applicants from the survey were admitted at signi￿cantly higher rates than the
aggregate rates for the entire applicant pool at each college, as one would expect given the
design of the survey. A total of 2,376 participants in the survey applied to at least one of
these 28 colleges, and 1,354 (57.8%) of these participants applied early to at least one of these
colleges. These 28 colleges received a total of 7,243 applications from survey participants.
We base our analysis on several numerical measures. We use the recentered scale for
SAT-1 scores, which include one mathematics score and one verbal score, with each score
ranging from 200 to 800. In addition, survey respondents listed their three most signi￿cant
accomplishments to provide a feel for extracurricular activities. We categorized these ac-
complishments in terms of attractiveness to college admissions o¢ cers on a 1 to 5 scale, with
5 as the most desirable and 1 the least. This student activity rating serves as a proxy for
6In addition to Harvard, Princeton, Yale and Stanford, the remaining two schools are MIT and Caltech.
7The College Admission Project was run jointly by Christopher Avery and Caroline Hoxby.
5an admissions o¢ ce rating. An experienced college admissions o¢ cer classi￿ed the quality
of the high schools that participated in the survey on a similar 1 to 5 scale.
(F1) At the very top schools, early applicants have stronger test scores on average than
regular applicants. At schools just below the very top, early applicants tend to have
lower test scores on average than regular applicants.
Table 2 presents detailed statistics for the fourteen individual colleges that received early
applications from more than 30 survey participants. The ￿ve top-ranked schools are Harvard,
Yale, Princeton, Stanford and M.I.T. At four of these schools, early applicants had higher
SAT scores on average than regular applicants. Across these schools, the average SAT score
of early applicants was 1468, compared to 1450 for regular applicants. The remaining nine
schools are also very selective, but at six of them early applicants had lower test scores on
average than regular applicants. Across these slightly lower-ranked schools, the average SAT
score of early applicants was 1389, compared to 1405 for the regular applicants.
(F2) Students who are admitted early are more likely to enroll than students who are ad-
mitted through regular admissions to those same colleges.
Table 3 provides information about matriculation rates (i.e. ￿yields￿ ) for admitted stu-
dents in the survey data. Almost all early admits to Early Decision colleges enroll. More
notably, early admits were also more likely to enroll than regular admits at all eight of the
most popular Early Action colleges. At six of the eight, the di⁄erence in yield rates was
more than ten percentage points.
(F3) Colleges favor early applicants ￿ both Early Action and Early Decision ￿ in their
admissions decisions.
As Tables 1 and 2 make clear, admit rates for early applicants were higher than for regular
applicants at all of the schools, and notably higher in almost every case. Of course, this sort
of raw comparison does not account for di⁄erences in the early and regular applicant pools.
To this end, we estimated a single probit regression using a sample of all applications by
survey students to one of the twenty-eight colleges listed in Table 1. The dependent variable
is the admission outcome (1 if admitted, 0 if not admitted). The unit of observation is an
6application, so a survey participant who applied to several of the colleges is included multiple
times in the sample.
The results from various speci￿cations are reported in Table 4. We control for application
characteristics including the student￿ s SAT scores, demographic and other student variables,
and characteristics of the student￿ s high school. The speci￿cations reported in Table 4 treat
the e⁄ect of an early application as additively separable; similar results are obtained with
a full set of pairwise interactions between the control variables and the early application
indicators.
Applying early is associated with a substantial increase in acceptance probability con-
ditional on application characteristics. The estimated e⁄ect is similar across speci￿cations,
and larger for early decision than early action. An EA application is associated with a 17
to 20 percentage point increase in admission probability, and an ED application with a 31
to 37 percentage point increase. These numbers are calculated for an applicant with the
average characteristics across applications to these thirty colleges. In every speci￿cation, the
EA coe¢ cient and the ED coe¢ cient are highly signi￿cant; the minimum t-statistic across
all speci￿cations is 5.11 for Early Action and 9.90 for Early Decision.
We also estimated separate speci￿cations for each of the fourteen individual colleges
that received the most early applications in the survey data, and used these estimates to
compute early and regular acceptance probabilities at each college for a student with mean
characteristics in the survey. These ￿conditional￿admit rates are reported in the last column
of Table 2. Conditional on application characteristics, applying early is associated with a
signi￿cantly larger admit rate at all eight Early Decision colleges and four of the six Early
Action colleges.
One obvious critique of these estimates of the admissions advantage of an early application
is that our regression speci￿cation does not control directly for self-selection. In particular,
admissions o¢ cers often suggest that early applicants are relatively more attractive than
regular applicants in ways that are not captured by the numerical measures that we use as
independent variables (e.g. early applicants demonstrate important organizational skills by
compiling their materials in time for the early application deadline).8 While we recognize
8Ideally, if all applicants applied to a substantial number of selective colleges, we could correct for self-
selection in the choice to apply early by comparing the results of early and regulalr applications for individual
students (e.g. with a ￿xed e⁄ects Probit spec￿cation). However, since the majority of selective colleges
in our sample o⁄er Early De￿nition, most students who were admitted early could not apply to any other
7the importance of this concern, we believe that the qualitative ￿nding that colleges favor
early applicants withstands this critique for three reasons. First, the students in the study
were selected to be representative of high-caliber applicants from well-known high schools,
so the homogeneity of the sample likely limits the degree of di⁄erentiation among students
due to omitted variables. Second, since early applicants are weaker than regular applicants
in terms of observable measures at all but the most selective colleges (as indicated above in
the discussion of (F1), it would be natural to assume that they would also be weaker than
regular applicants in non-observable qualities at all but the most selective colleges. Third,
the student activity rating captures a reasonable amount of information about each student￿ s
non-academic accomplishments. A student activity rating of 2 represents an ordinary level of
activity in school activities and clubs, while a rating of 4 represents superior achievement in
some activity, such as a state championship in some event. The estimated e⁄ect of an Early
Decision application on one￿ s admissions probability is four times as large as the estimated
e⁄ect of an increase in student activity rating from 2 to 4. It does not seem possible that
any unmeasured di⁄erence in average applicant quality between early and regular applicants
could be of this magnitude.
(F4) Students may bene￿t from two forms of strategic application behavior: (1) applying
Early Decision even if there is considerable uncertainty about a ￿rst-choice college; (2)
applying early to a college that is not one￿ s ￿rst choice.
To the extent that early application conveys a sizeable advantage, students can face
di¢ cult choice in applying. The dilemma is widely recognized. As one college counselor put
it: ￿Early applications give students a ￿ hook￿that they should use strategically.￿Students
applying Early Decision have a particularly acute trade-o⁄ because they must weigh the
admissions advantage against the potential cost of premature commitment. Avery, Fairbanks
and Zeckhauser (2003) found that in retrospective interviews, less than two-thirds of students
who applied early and were attending Early Decision colleges had a strong preference for
that college at the time that they applied.
A further complication is that for a given student, the bene￿t of early application may
vary across colleges. For example, a student who is substantially below or above the bar
for admission at a given college will not get an admissions bene￿t from applying early.
colleges once they were accepted.
8Instead, early application is likely to be most e¢ cacious at a college where the student is
competitive but not certain (or possibly not likely) to be admitted as a regular applicant.
As a result, it frequently may be optimal for a student to apply early to a second or lower
choice college rather than to a long-shot ￿rst-choice college. Again, this situation seems to
be well understood. As another college counselor explained: ￿If you are willing to lower
expectation one rung lower, you might be able to get better outcomes [by applying early].￿
(F5) EA is disproportionately used by the highest ranked schools, whereas lower ranked
schools typically use ED.
This last stylized fact relates to the use of early admissions programs by di⁄erent insti-
tutions, and we have already mentioned the evidence. Of the top six schools in the current
US News rankings, four o⁄er EA and none o⁄er ED. Of the remaining thirty-two ￿most
selective￿schools, twenty-one o⁄er ED and only ￿ve o⁄er EA.
3 The Model
We now develop a model that allows us to organize and explain the evidence presented above.
Its key feature is that students are di⁄erentiated in their academic ability and also in their
￿￿t￿for di⁄erent schools. The attraction of early admission programs is that they allow
schools to identify students who are particularly enthusiastic and likely to be a good match.
For a lower-ranked school, an Early Decision program also o⁄ers the opportunity to capture
very quali￿ed students who in a more orderly admissions market might end up enrolling at
a higher-ranked institution. As we will see, this latter e⁄ect does not operate to the bene￿t
of the very best schools.
Our model is quite stark. There is a population of students of unit measure, and three
schools: selective colleges A and B, and a third school C that accepts all applicants. Each
of the two selective schools can enroll K < 1=2 of students. We will assume that students
generally favor school A, which consequently is the most selective and which we think of as
the more ￿highly-ranked￿school.
Each student is described by a pair of characteristics (v;y), where v indicates the student￿ s
ability as it will be assessed by colleges, and y indicates the student￿ s relative preference or
￿t for the selective colleges. A student of type (v;y) receives utility u(s;y) from attending
9school s. We normalize u(C;y) = 0, and assume that u(A;y);u(B;y) > 0, and also that
u(A;y)=u(B;y) is increasing in y and crosses one at y = 0. Students with high y are therefore
enthusiastic about school A, while students with a low y are enthusiastic about B.9
Let G denote the distribution of student types in the population, where G has rectangular
support V ￿ Y. To capture the idea that the most academically-oriented students may be
the ones with the greatest desire to attend the higher-ranked school, we assume that (v;y)
are a¢ liated. The assumption that students tend to prefer school A is captured by letting
Gy(0jv) 2 (0;1=2) for all v. A limiting case of the model that proves useful below relaxes
this assumption and instead assumes the schools are "symmetric" in the sense that (v;y) are
independent and Gy(0) = 1=2. For future reference, we de￿ne V = G￿1
v (1 ￿ 2K) to be the
quality threshold such that if all students of ability v ￿ V matriculate at selective schools,
and divide themselves equally, both schools are exactly at capacity.
Both selective schools prefer students of high academic ability and students who are a
better ￿t. We denote the value that school A and B assign to a student with characteris-
tics (v;y) as ￿A(v;y) and ￿B(v;y), where ￿A is increasing in (v;y) and ￿B is increasing in
(v;￿y).10 We assume that each school wants to maximize its average value for the students
who enroll. To ensure that school B is not tempted to admit low ability students indiscrim-
inately in search of better ￿ts, we assume that for any set ￿ ￿ Y, Ey[￿B(v;y)jv;y 2 ￿] is
increasing in v. This is immediate if v and y are independent, and holds under a¢ liation
provided school B places su¢ cient weight on student ability.
Early applications can play an important role in signaling student preferences when
the information required to implement an e¢ cient match between students and colleges is
dispersed. In the baseline version of the model, we assume a clean separation of information.
Students know their preferences at the time they apply, but not how colleges will assess their
academic ability (i.e. each student knows her y, but not her v). Later we will show that our
results carry through even if students have a fair amount of information about v, so long as
the information isn￿ t perfect. In contrast, we assume each school can assess the academic
ability of applicants accurately (i.e. each college learns the true value v for each student) but
cannot infer enthusiasm (the true value y) directly from a student￿ s application. Of course
9There are many reasons why elite colleges may attract di⁄erent types of students. For instance, A might
emphasize undergraduate research while B￿ s relative strength is how it integrates academics with residential
life. These comparative strengths may appeal to di⁄erent types of applicants.
10One implication of each college maximizing its average value for individual students is that we rule out
peer e⁄ects in the colleges￿payo⁄ function.
10if v;y are correlated, knowledge of one of these values may provide some information about
the other.
Throughout the paper, we consider the following admissions game. Colleges ￿rst an-
nounce if they will o⁄er early admissions. Students then submit applications and can poten-
tially designate one application as an ￿early￿application. We assume the cost of submitting
applications is negligible, so that students ￿nd it optimal to apply everywhere.11 The schools
then make their admission decisions, and ￿nally students choose among the colleges where
they were admitted. Naturally students enroll at their preferred school, except that a stu-
dent admitted Early Decision must enroll at that school. We analyze equilibria of this game
in which the colleges cannot commit in advance to favoring (or disfavoring) early applicants
by any particular amount; this focus rules out the possibility that a school would seek to
in￿ uence applicant decisions by pre-committing to a speci￿c admissions rule that is subse-
quently suboptimal. Such behavior might bene￿t a school in theory, but seems inconsistent
with the actual operation of the market.
4 Regular Admissions Equilibrium
Suppose the schools o⁄er only regular admissions. Each student will apply to all three
colleges, and the selective schools will choose their admissions policies to maximize their ex-
pected payo⁄subject to the constraint that they expect to enroll K students. In equilibrium,
each school correctly anticipates the overall pattern of admission and enrollment decisions,
and hence will exactly meet its enrollment target. We say that a school uses a threshold
admissions policy if it admits all applicants with ability above some cut-o⁄, and a threshold
equilibrium is one in which both selective colleges use threshold policies.
There is a unique regular admissions equilibrium and it has a threshold structure. In
equilibrium, school A admits all students with v ￿ AR and school B admits all students
with v ￿ BR, where AR > BR. Students with ability above AR are admitted at both schools
and choose their preferred school. This leads to full enrollment at A. School B￿ s remaining
spaces are ￿lled by the students with abilities between AR and BR.
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium in which students apply to both schools and
11The problem of application costs, and the issues they raise for early admissions, has been studied by
Chade, Lewis and Smith (2006) and Lien (2007).
11the schools use admission thresholdsAR;BR with Gv(ARjy ￿ 0) = K and BR = V < AR.
The equilibrium thresholds can be found constructively, and are illustrated in Figure 1.
When both schools use threshold policies, the top students are admitted everywhere and
the majority enroll at school A. So A must have the higher threshold and AR must satisfy
Gv(ARjy ￿ 0) = K, where Gv the mass of students with abilities above AR, or the reverse
cdf. Meanwhile BR must equal V (i.e. Gv(BR) = 2K) because all students with abilities
above BR will enroll at one of the selective schools and their numbers must total 2K.
Proposition 1 rules out the possibility of non-threshold equilibria. These equilibria may
exist in the limiting ￿symmetric￿case where (v;y) are independent and Gy(0) = 1=2. The
reason is that each school bene￿ts from admitting students who are also admitted at the other
school, because such students will self-select on the basis of ￿t in making their enrollment
decision. In the symmetric case, therefore, there can be equilibria in which the schools use
identical admissions policies but do not admit only the best students. These equilibria involve
a coordination failure: the schools would be better o⁄ using threshold policies, but neither
school individually wants to switch to one. The proof of Proposition 1, in the appendix,
shows that this type of coordination failure cannot occur if there is even a bit of hierarch
between the schools.
An important feature of the regular admissions equilibrium is that the highest ranked-
students ￿ those with abilities AR or higher ￿ self-select into their preferred college. This
provides an element of preference-based sorting even in the absence of an explicit signaling
method such as an early application. Nevertheless, it should be clear from Figure 1 that
at least school B would be anxious to have additional information about the ￿t of marginal
candidates who do not self-select in their enrollment choice. This gives rise to a sorting
rationale for early admissions that we explore in the next section.
5 Early Action Programs
Early action programs create a signalling opportunity because a student can apply early
to only one school. In our model, this e⁄ect operates only if both schools accept early
applicants. If a single school introduced early action and students expected an advantage,
they all would apply early, making the application uninformative. If both schools o⁄er early
action, however, and students expect an early advantage, their application choices will be
12informative. This provides schools with an incentive to favor early applicants, rationalizing
student expectations.
To investigate this possibility, we look for early action equilibria in which market par-
ticipants use threshold strategies. In such an equilibrium, schools A and B use separate
thresholds for early and regular applicants, denoted AEA;ARA and BEA;BRA, and students
apply early to A rather than to B if their relative preference for A lies above some cut-o⁄.
As it turns out, there are always threshold equilibria that simply replicate the regular admis-
sions outcome. In one such equilibrium, students expect A to disadvantage early applicants
and so all apply early to B. In this case, an early application conveys no information, so
any early admission policy is optimal for A, including the conjectured behavior of favoring
regular applicants. To rule out this uninteresting case, we focus on equilibria that are robust
to a small perturbation of application behavior in which a vanishing fraction of students with
the strongest preferences for schools A and B apply early to these schools. We prove the
following result in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 There is always a robust threshold equilibrium when both colleges o⁄er Early
Action. In any such equilibrium: (1) students apply early to A if and only if y ￿ YEA > 0;
(2) admission thresholds satisfy BEA < V < BRA and BEA < AEA < A < ARA; and (3)
early admissions yields are higher than regular admissions yields.
The equilibria described in Proposition 2 match the empirical patterns described earlier.
First, it is easier to be admitted early: both schools apply a strictly lower admission threshold
for early applications. Second, this advantage leads some students to apply early to their
lower-ranked second choice. Third, provided that (v;y) are correlated, the more highly-
ranked school A has an early applicant pool that has higher average academic quality than
its regular pool, while the reverse is true for the lower-ranked school B. Fourth, both schools
enjoy yields from early admits that are at least as high as their regular admission yields.
Figure 2 depicts an early action equilibrium. To understand the incentives in this equi-
librium, consider ￿rst the application decision. With BEA < AEA, it is clearly optimal
for a student who prefers B (y ￿ 0) to apply early to B. This maximizes both the prob-
ability of admission to a selective school (A or B) and the probability of admission to the
most preferred school (B). There is a trade-o⁄, however, for a student who strictly prefers
A (y > 0). In this case, applying early to A maximizes the probability of admission to the
13most preferred school (A), but not the probability of admission to a selective school (A or
B).
Speci￿cally, if the student turns out to be a candidate who would be admitted to A
only as an early applicant (ability between AEA and ARA), an early application to A rather
than B increases the student￿ s payo⁄ by u(A;y) ￿ u(B;y). Alternatively, if the student
turns out to be a candidate whose ability falls between BEA and minfAEA;BRAg, an early
application to A rather than B leads to a loss of u(B;y). Each student assesses this trade-o⁄







Optimal application behavior follows a cut-o⁄ rule because both the relative likelihood of
bene￿ting from an early application to A, and the preference for A are increasing in y. In
addition, any student who prefers B (y ￿ 0) strictly prefers to apply early to B, so that if
YEA is the cut-o⁄above which students apply early to A, YEA > 0 and at least some students
who prefer A nevertheless apply early to B.
Now consider what determines the school￿ s admission thresholds in Figure 2. For school
A￿ s thresholds to be optimal, it cannot bene￿t by slightly increasing or decreasing its early
threshold and making a corresponding change in its regular threshold to keep its class size
constant. In other words, school A must be just indi⁄erent between the marginal enrollees
from its early and late application pools, taking into account both the information revealed
in the application decision and the information that will later be revealed in the enrollment
decision. That is,
E[￿A(v;y)jv = AEA;y ￿ YEA] = E[￿A(v;y)jv = ARA;0 ￿ y < YEA]: (2)
In addition, A￿ s admissions thresholds must satisfy its yield target
m(v ￿ AEA;y ￿ YEA) + m(v ￿ ARA;0 ￿ y < YEA) = K; (3)
Here m(￿;￿) denotes the measure of students satisfying the stated conditions. These two
conditions pin down school A￿ s admission thresholds, AEA and ARA, in Figure 2.12
12It is possible that in equilibrium all students apply early to B and so A enrolls no regular applicants.
Nevertheless, the focus on robust equilibria means that conditions (2) and (3) still hold.
14School B￿ s equilibrium thresholds in Figure 2 satisfy a similar condition ensuring that B
is just indi⁄erent between marginal matriculants. The condition for school B is that
E[￿B(v;y)jv = BEA;y < YEA] = E[￿B(v;y)jv = BRA;y ￿ YEA]: (4)
Furthermore, its admission thresholds must satisfy the yield target
m(v ￿ BEA;y ￿ 0) + m(ARA > v ￿ BEA;YEA > y ￿ 0) (5)
+m(AEA > v ￿ BRA;y ￿ YEA) = K:
These two equations pin down the admissions thresholds BEA and BRA in Figure 2.
Proposition 2 leaves open the possibility that in equilibrium B optimally sets its regular
admission threshold BRA above AEA, and so does not enroll any regular applicants.13 Then
its thresholds still satisfy the yield target (5), but the marginal early matriculant is strictly
preferred so that the equality in (4) becomes an inequality.
Our next result states that the additional sorting allowed by early action operates to the
bene￿t of the selective schools.
Proposition 3 Both selective schools bene￿t from early action relative to regular admis-
sions.
Proof. The argument relies on revealed preference. To start, ￿x the students and B at
their equilibrium behavior. School A can replicate its regular admissions outcome by setting
AEA = ARA = A. With this policy it ultimately will enroll all students with v ￿ A and
y ￿ 0, despite some of these students having applied early to B. Instead, A￿ s equilibrium
thresholds involve AEA < A < ARA, and so by revealed preference it prefers the early action
outcome.
Now consider school B. Fix the students and A at their equilibrium behavior. If B uses
its regular admissions policy BEA = BRA = V , it already does strictly better than in the
regular admissions equilibrium. It loses students with v 2 [AEA;A) and y ￿ YEA, but gains
an equivalent mass of students with v 2 [A;ARA) and y 2 [0;y). The new group has higher
13For this reason, it is natural to solve ￿rst for A￿ s admissions thresholds and then subsequently for B￿ s
admissions thresholds in any constructive approach to identifying a threshold equilibrium.
15v￿ s and lower y￿ s. Additionally B￿ s equilibrium strategy departs from its regular admission
policy so by revealed preference the early action outcome is even better. Q.E.D.
Early action bene￿ts the schools but not all the students. This can be seen in Figure
2. Students who prefer the lower-ranked school B are unambiguously better o⁄. But stu-
dents who prefer A can lose from the introduction of early action if it results in them: (1)
enrolling at C rather than B (if y ￿ YEA and BR < v < minfAEA;BRA)), or (2) enrolling
at B rather than A (if 0 < y < YEA and AR ￿ v < ARA). In general, each action helps
match enthusiasts to the college they prefer, so students with a preference for B or a strong
preference for A bene￿t, but students with just a mild preference for A may lose. Under
slightly stronger assumptions than we have made, in particular if u(y;A) is increasing in
y and u(y;B) decreasing in y, then early action induces an improvement over the regular
admissions equilibrium (in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance) in the distribution
of realized student utilties. on average the bene￿ts of early admissions outweigh the costs
so the average student utility is increased by early action.14 Thus, early action can be said
to produce an ex ante Pareto improvement over regular admissions. Though some student
achieve ex post lower utilities with early action than with regular admissions, it is still the
case that average student utilities are higher with early action than in the regular admissions
equilibrium.
Propositions 2 and 3 extend to a more realistic setting in which students have informa-
tion about their academic standing when they are deciding where to apply. Suppose that
in addition to knowing their relative preference for the schools, each applicant observes a
signal w that is informative about v. Such a signal conveniently captures observable as-
pects of academic standing such as grade point average or test scores. A student is then
characterized by a triple (v;w;y). We assume the joint distribution of characteristics in the
population is a¢ liated, again with rectangular support. We also assume that ￿k (v;y)f(wjv)
in strictly increasing in v for k = A;B, and that conditional on w, (v;y) are independent.
These assumptions imply that students have some residual uncertainty about their academic
standing, and ensure that schools are not tempted to depart from threshold policies.
In the extended model, the regular admissions situation is the same as before. Students
14This can be seen in Figure 2 by noting that the students enrolling in A under early action have weakly
higher y￿ s than the students enrolling in A under regular admissions. Similarly, the students enrolling in B
under early action have weakly lower y￿ s than those enrolling in B under regular admissions.
16still apply to all schools and the schools set their admissions thresholds A;B to just ￿ll their
classes. When early action is introduced, however, students use their information about
relative rank in deciding where to apply. All else equal a student who is more optimistic
about her academic standing will be more inclined to reach for the more selective school A,
leading to the following conclusion about equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 4 Suppose students are heterogenous in both their preferences and their beliefs
about their academic standing. A robust threshold equilibrium still exists with early action,
and in any such equilibrium: (1) all students apply early to A if and only if y ￿ YEA(w),
where YEA(w) is strictly positive and decreasing in w; and (2) school policies satisfy BEA <
V < BRA and BEA < AEA < ARA. As before, both schools bene￿t from early action relative
to regular admissions.
The sorting behavior described in Proposition 4 provides an explanation for why highly
ranked schools receive relatively strong early applications on dimensions such as test scores
and grades that are readily accessible, and also why lower ranked schools receive relatively
weak early applications on these dimensions. Students with strong observable characteristics
are more optimistic about admission and hence see less reason to play it safe with their early
application. So early applicants tend to be stronger than regular applicants at college A,
but weaker at college B even if there is no correlation between ability (v) and preferences
(y).
The welfare properties we have described depend to some extent on frictionless commu-
nication of preferences via early action signaling. In the model we￿ ve proposed, it is possible
that if some students are unable to apply early, or if students do not have full information
about their preferences at the early appliction deadline, then equilibrium forces may lead
the schools to accept and favor early applicants but the schools would be collectively better
o⁄ if they accepted only regular applications.
Proposition 5 If a fraction of students cannot apply early, it is possible to have an Early
Action equilibrium in which both schools do worse than under regular admissions.15
This point can be understood in the context of a simple example. Suppose that a fraction
1￿￿ of students cannot apply early, and that these students are otherwise no di⁄erent from
15Avery (2008) produces a similar result for the case where all students can apply early, but they do not
have complete information about their preferences at the early application deadline.
17the general population. Suppose in addition that students have no w signal and v;y are
independently and uniformly distributed on [0;1] ￿ [￿1;1]. This corresponds to a limiting
￿symmetric￿case of our model. If the schools accept only regular applications then regardless
of the exact school preferences there is a unique threshold equilibrium in which A = B =
V = 1 ￿ 2K.16
The introduction of early admissions in this example can lead to an equilibrium that is
Pareto inferior for the schools. Suppose that school preferences satisfy ￿A(v;y) = v + ￿y
and ￿B(v;y) = v ￿ ￿y. The parameter ￿ represents the weight that colleges place on ￿t
relative to academic ability. Figure 3 illustrates a symmetric early action equilibrium. In
equilibrium, the students apply early to their preferred school, except for the fraction 1 ￿ ￿
that cannot apply early, and the schools use identical admission thresholds. The thresholds
satisfy AEA = BEA = V ￿ 1
2￿(1 ￿ ￿) and ARA = BRA = V + 1
2￿￿.17
The early action equilibrium depicted in Figure 3 is worse for the schools than the regular
admissions equilibrium. In both cases, college A enrolls only students who view it as their
￿rst choice (i.e. have y ￿ 0), and similarly for B. But in the early action case, the colleges
enroll some students with abilities below V , and reject others with abilities above V because
those students failed to apply early. Compared to the regular admissions equilibrium, each
school￿ s entering class has lower academic quality and no improvement in student ￿t. The
problem is that once some students are applying early to their ￿rst choice college, and one
school favors early applicants, the other has a strict incentive to do so as well in order to
cherry-pick students on the basis of ￿t. The result is a coordination failure along the lines
discussed above, but one that does not disappear if a small asymmetry is introduced between
the schools.18
16There are also non-threshold equilibria, but they are not robust to even the slightest asymmetry between
the schools. That is, suppose students have a slight preference for school A, so that Gy(0) = 1=2 ￿ ". For
each " there is a unique regular admission equilibrium and as " ! 0 the equilibrium thresholds A(");B(")
approach V .
17For these thresholds to be interior, we require that 1 ￿ 1
2￿￿ < 1 ￿ 2K < 1
2￿(1 ￿ ￿). With the stated











to just meet its yield target. Neither school wants to deviate because the marginal early enrollee is valued at
AEA +￿=2, the same value a school would obtain from slightly lowering its regular admission threshold and
admitting students of quality v = ARA. As with the regular admissions case, there are other equilibria as well,
including one in which both schools apply the same threshold V to early and late applicants. The equilibrium
we have described, however, is robust to small asymmetry between the schools, while the equilibrium that
replicates the regular admissions equilibrium is not.
18One can view this as a form of adverse selection. If BEA < V < BRA, then if A were to set AEA = V =
ARA, the marginal regular admits would be adversely selected on the basis of ￿t relative to the marginal
early admits.
186 Early Decision Programs
We now investigate the e⁄ects of Early Decision programs in which students are required
to make a binding commitment to enroll if admitted early. Our main insight is that Early
Decision enables lower-ranked schools to capture some highly desired students who are un-
sure of their abilities at the time of application. This competitive e⁄ect operates to the
detriment of top-ranked schools, providing a reason for them to be less enthusiastic about
early admissions, at least when their competitors require a commitment from students.
The setting is the same as before, except that early admission is now a binding commit-
ment. We again look for robust threshold equilibria in which schools use distinct admissions
thresholds for their early and late applicants, and students apply early to A if and only if
they have a su¢ ciently strong preference for it. Our next result, characterizes such equilibria.
Proposition 6 With early decision, there is at least one robust threshold equilibrium. In
any such equilibrium: (1) students apply early to A if and only if y ￿ YED, where YED > 0;
and (2) school admission policies satisfy BED < V < BRD and BED < AED < ARD.
Figure 4 illustrates an Early Decision equilibrium; the incentives are similar to the case
of early action. Consider, for instance, the application behavior of students. In equilibrium,
students realize an admissions bene￿t from applying early to B, but at a cost to students
with y > 0. Students who prefer B simply apply early to B. Students who prefer A trade
o⁄ the admissions bene￿t of applying early to B against the cost of not being able to enroll
at A if they are that have su¢ cient academic standing to be admitted. Following the same







The left hand side is strictly increasing in y and equal to zero at y = 0. So the optimal
policy for students involves a cut-o⁄ YED > 0, just as with early action.
On the school side, A￿ s enrollees come entirely from its early applicant pool, because any
student admitted regular has also been admitted to B and is obligated to enroll. So A￿ s early
admissions threshold is pinned down by its yield target:
mfv ￿ AED;y ￿ YEDg = K. (7)
19School A is indi⁄erent between a range of regular admissions thresholds, but we show in
the Appendix that if the equilibrium is robust, A￿ s regular threshold must be set so that
Ey[￿A(v;ygjv = ARD;y ￿ 0] is just equal to the expected payo⁄from a marginal early admit,
E[￿A (v;y)jv = AED;y ￿ YED].
School B￿ s problem is similar to the early action case. In the equilibrium depicted in
Figure 4, school B must be just indi⁄erent between a marginal enrollee from its early and
regular applicant pools, so that (4) holds with ED subscripts in place of EA, and B must also
admit just enough students to satisfy its yield target. The latter implies that in equilibrium
mfv ￿ BED;y < YEDg + mfv 2 [BRD;AED];y ￿ YEDg = K: (8a)
As in the early action case, it is also possible to have an equilibrium in which school B ￿lls
its class entirely from its early applicant pool, in which case the optimality conditions are
again similar to early action.
An interesting point about the early decision equilibria described in Proposition 6 is that
the form of admission o⁄ered by school A is not in fact important. All of the students who
in equilibrium apply early to A would choose to attend even if the binding commitment was
relaxed. So having A switch to a policy of early action would not a⁄ect the set of possible
equilibria. Moreover, in equilibrium A ￿lls its class entirely with students who chose not
to apply early to B. So if A eliminates early admissions entirely, there is an equilibrium in
which exactly the students who would have applied early to A instead submit only regular
applications, and A applies its early decision threshold AED to all its all applicants. This
equilibrium gives rise to precisely the same allocation of student to schools.
This argument suggests why very top-ranked schools such as Harvard, Princeton, Yale,
Stanford and M.I.T. may incur the least cost from moving away from Early Decision toward
Early Action, or even from eliminating early admissions entirely. These schools have less
reason to think they will lose top students by making the admissions commitment non-
binding. Flipping this around, of course, it is lower-ranked schools that stand to gain the
most from binding early admissions because it allows them to capture some highly quali￿ed
students who might otherwise turn them down. The next Proposition states this formally,
showing that the welfare properties of Early Decision are quite di⁄erent from the Early
Action case.
20Proposition 7 School B prefers Early Decision to Regular Admissions, and may or may not
prefer Early Decision to Early Action. School A may prefer both Early Action and Regular
Admissions to Early Decision.
Proof. Consider school B ￿rst. Suppose we ￿x the students and school A at their Early
Decision equilibrium behavior. Then one way for school B to meet its yield target is to use a
uniform threshold BED = BRD = V . With this policy, school B does better than with regular
admissions because it captures a set of students with higher v￿ s and lower y￿ s. So by revealed
preference, school B prefers an Early Decision equilibrium to the regular admissions outcome.
The remaining claims are shown in the Appendix via a series of numerical examples.Q.E.D.
In comparing Early Decision to regular admissions, school B obtains two bene￿ts. First,
it is able to obtain some highly ranked students who prefer A but nevertheless apply early
to B. This provides a competitive rationale. Second, as in the previous section, it is able to
favor enthusiasts on the admissions margin. This provide a sorting rationale. The situation
for school A is di⁄erent. It does get the sorting e⁄ect of having only students with y ￿ YED
in its pool of potential enrollees, but it su⁄ers from the loss of some highly ranked students.
Because of this cost, it is straightforward to construct examples in which the introduction
of Early Decision policies makes school A less well o⁄.
The comparison between Early Decision and Early Action is more subtle. If the students
were to use the same application rule under both Early Decision and Early Action, i.e. a
￿xed threshold Y > 0 for deciding whether to apply early to A or B, then school B would
certainly prefer Early Decision. Because students anticipate the possibility of being locked
in to a binding commitment, however, they are more reluctant to apply early to B. All else
equal this reduces the number of students who want to apply early to B, and this can has
ambiguous sorting consequences for the ￿rms. For example, if almost no students apply
Early Decision to B in equilibrium, then B will likely do better with Early Action than
Early Decision. More generally, if introducing Early Decision has limited e⁄ect on the set
of students applying early to B, then B will generally do best with Early Decision, but if
introducing Early Decision causes a substantial shift of early applicants from B to A, then
it is quite possible that B will prefer Early Action to Early Decision.
217 Discussion
We have focused on a simple model that explains many of the basic empirical facts about
early admissions. The model emphasizes two e⁄ects of early admissions: the sorting e⁄ect
under which early applications convey enthusiasm about a school, and the competitive e⁄ect
under which a lower ranked school, by adopting and early decision policy, can attract some
highly ranked but cautious students from a more highly ranked school. These e⁄ects shed
light on why schools appear to favor early applicants, why student application behavior
exhibits particular patterns of sorting, and why selective schools, particularly those not at
the very top, may bene￿t from the use of early admission programs.
The aspects of early admissions highlighted in our model are likely not the only reasons
why schools have adopted such policies. One role of early admissions that we do not capture
is yield management. Particularly at small colleges, there may be a signi￿cant downside to
over-enrollment if it leads to crowded dorms or strained resources, and making conservative
admissions decisions may require excessive reliance on the wait list. Admitting a fraction
of the class early, with a binding commitment, may mitigate this risk.19 Schools may also
want to increase yield for less benign reasons. Historically, yield was one of the metrics used
by US News and World Report in their college rankings, and it is possible that this created
an incentive for schools to rely more heavily on early decision in order to manipulate the
rankings process.
For students, early decision policies also interact with the provision of ￿nancial aid. One
issue of particular concern is that a binding early commitment may preclude a student from
￿shopping around￿for the best ￿nancial aid package. This creates a dilemma for students
with limited resources who want the admissions bene￿t of applying early.20 Of course, some
students may also bene￿t from early admissions for reasons we have not emphasized. Some
students may enjoy learning mid-way through senior year that they have a secure position,
and receiving an early noti￿cation of admission may allow them to avoid some of the time-
consuming process of ￿lling out applications.
19Indeed, when Harvard and Princeton eliminated early admissions in 2007-08, both found that enrollment
fell far short of target, leading to heavy reliance on their waitlists.
20Kim (2007) argues that need-blind colleges could even use early decision programs to surreptitiously
attract wealthy applicants. In practice, the latter concern seems somewhat unlikely given that the objectives
of need-blind universities clearly go well beyond maximizing tuition revenue, and these institutions seem to
be the ones that employ the least restrictive practices are the most ambivalent about early admissions.
22It is also possible that for certain students the signaling aspect of an early application is
somewhat richer than is captured in our speci￿c model. For example, an early application
from a student at a high school that does not send many students to a selective college may
indicate a promising level of ambition. Lee (2009) has also highlighted a related informational
issue, namely that early decision policies could protect a school against a winner￿ s curse in
enrollment decisions. We observed a related phenomenon in the proof of Proposition 5, where
we argued that under certain conditions schools might adopt early admission programs to
match competitors but be collectively better o⁄ if these programs were eliminated.
Finally, we note that early admissions programs can be viewed as a form of ￿market
unravelling￿of the kind described by Roth and Xing (1994). In many of the markets they
consider, a social cost of unravelling is that it appears to reduce the e¢ ciency of market as-
signments by precluding the use of late-arriving information. Our analysis suggests that one
bene￿t of early admissions may in fact be to increase the ￿ ow of information across the mar-
ket by creating a credible opportunity for students to signal interest. Nevertheless, a similar
point can be made that by moving up the entire college admissions process, early admission
programs force young students to make committing decisions even as their preferences may
be evolving. Certainly all of these aspects of early application need to be considered if one
is to evaluate possible reforms to the market.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
First, it is easy to see that if the schools use threshold policies, the yield constraints imply
that A = Gv(Ajy ￿ 0) (otherwise A would enroll either more or less than K students) and
hence B = V . Now, consider any two admissions policies, not necessarily of threshold form.
If B admits only students that are admitted by A, then B will enroll strictly fewer students
than A. So satisfying both yield constraints implies there is some set of students [v0;v00] who
are admitted only by B. In equilibrium, A can￿ t admit any students with ability below v00,
or it could bene￿t by rejecting some of these students in favor of students with abilities in
[v0;v00]. Moreover, B can￿ t reject any students with abilities above v00 or else it could bene￿t
by accepting them in favor of students in [v0;v00]. It follows that in equilibrium B must use
a threshold policy, and therefore A must use one as well. Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 4
Here we establish our existence and characterization results for Early Action equilibria. As
described in the text, we are interested in equilibria that are robust to having a vanishing
fraction of students with the strongest preference for schools A and B apply early to those
schools. Say that student behavior is "-perturbed if each student is constrained with prob-
ability " to apply early to A if y ￿ Y ("), apply early to B if y ￿ Y (") and otherwise apply





threshold equilibrium of the unperturbed game is robust if it is the limit as " ! 0 of a
sequence of threshold equilibria of "-perturbed games.
In what follows, we describe properties of optimal admissions and application behavior.
We then prove that robust equilibria exist and characterize their properties.
Optimal Admissions Policies
1. (Monotonicity) Suppose students use a threshold application policy. If one school uses
a threshold admissions policy, then the other school has a threshold policy that is a
best response.
Proof. We establish that given the stated conditions, a school strictly prefers to admit
high-v students to low-v students if acceptance leads to some students enrolling. We consider
the case where students get a w signal; the no w case is essentially identical.
24Start with school A. If A accepts a v applicant early, the student will enroll if y ￿ eA(v;w),
where eA(v;w) equals Y (w) if v < BRA and maxf0;Y (w)g if v ￿ BRA. Note that eA is
increasing in v. Therefore A￿ s expected value,
Z w
w
Ey [￿A (v; ~ y)jw; ~ y ￿ eA(v;w)]f(wjv)dw;
is increasing in v because the integrand is increasing.
If A accepts a v applicant regular, the student will enroll if y ￿ rA(v), where rA(v) equals
y if v < BEA and 0 if v ￿ BEA. Again rA(v) is increasing in v, and so is A￿ s expected value
Z w
w
Ey [￿A (v; ~ y)jw;rA(v) ￿ ~ y ￿ Y (w)]f(wjv)dw.
Now consider B. If B accepts a v applicant early, the student will enroll if y ￿ eB(v;w),
where eB(v;w) equals Y (w) if v < ARA and minf0;Y (w)g if v ￿ ARA. So eB is decreasing
in v, and B￿ s expected payo⁄
Z w
w
Ey [￿B (v; ~ y)jw; ~ y ￿ eB(v;w)]f(wjv)dw;
is increasing in v, again because the integrand is increasing.
Finally, if B accepts a v applicant regular, the student will enroll if v ￿ rB(v), where
rB(v) equals y if v < AEA and 0 if v ￿ AEA. So rB is decreasing in v, and B￿ s expected
payo⁄ Z w
w
Ey [￿B (v; ~ y)jw;Y (w) ￿ ~ y ￿ rB(v)]f(wjv)dw,
is increasing in v. Q.E.D.
2. (Favoritism) Suppose students use a threshold application policy. Then each school
has greater expected payo⁄ from an v candidate who applied early than a v candidate
who applied regular.
Proof. Consider school A. An early application reveals that y ￿ Y (w), so A￿ s average
value from early v applicants is at least Ew [￿A(v;Y (~ w))jv], and strictly higher provided
Y (w) < y for some fraction of w signals. Its value from regular v applicants is no greater
than this amount. Similarly, B￿ s payo⁄ from an early (regular) v candidates is bounded
below (above) by Ew [￿B(v;Y (~ w))jv]. Q.E.D.
3. Suppose students use a threshold application policy. If one school uses a threshold pol-
icy, the other can optimally use a threshold policy that weakly favors early applicants.
25Proof. This follows from the previous two claims. If A considers a non-threshold policy
for one applicant pool, switching to the highest threshold that satis￿es the yield target will
be at least a weak improvement. Similarly, if A considers thresholds AEA > ARA satisfying
its yield target, lowering AEA and raising ARA while keeping yield constant will be at least
a weak improvement. The same argument applies for school B. Q.E.D.
4. Suppose students use an threshold application policy and school B uses a threshold
admission policy. Let ￿(Y;B) be A￿ s optimal threshold choices that satisfy AEA ￿
ARA. Then ￿(Y;B) is non-empty, upper semi-continuous, convex and compact-valued.
The same properties hold for ￿(Y;A), similarly de￿ned for school B.
Proof. Consider school A. Given Y;B, it wants to choose thresholds AEA ￿ ARA that
meet its yield target and achieve the highest expected payo⁄ Ew;y [￿A(v; ~ y)j(v; ~ w; ~ y) 2 A],
where A denotes the set of types that will enroll and depends on its admission choices. The
optimal policy (or policies) can be found constructively. Start with AEA = ARA equal to
the unique value that satis￿es the yield target given Y;B.21 If there are no early applicants,
this is the uniquely optimal choice of ARA and any AEA is optimal. Similarly if there are no
regular applicants, AEA is uniquely optimal along with any ARA. If there are early and late
applicants but at the uniform thresholds no regular matriculants, i.e. if Y (w) ￿ 0 for all w
and ARA ￿ BEA, then AEA is uniquely optimal along with any ARA ￿ BEA.
The last case is where the uniform threshold results in early and late matriculants. From
the proof of Claim 2, the marginal early matriculant is strictly preferred to the marginal
late matriculant. So consider lowering AEA and raising ARA while maintaining yield. By the
proof of Claim 1, each such adjustment results in a strictly smaller improvement to average
payo⁄. Continue until either: (i) the marginal matriculants are equal value, in which case
we￿ ve found the unique optimum; or (ii) there are no regular matriculants (if ARA hits BEA
and Y (w) ￿ 0 for all w) in which case we￿ ve found the uniquely optimal AEA and any higher
ARA is optimal; or (iii) AEA = v in which case we￿ ve again found a unique optimum. In each
case, optimal behavior involves AEA < ARA.
The constructive argument establishes that ￿(Y;B) is non-empty, compact and convex.
Upper semi-continuity follows from Berge￿ s Theorem (A￿ s average payo⁄objective is contin-
uous in A;B;Y , and its set of thresholds meeting the yield constraint is usc in B;Y ). The
same arguments apply for school B, showing that ￿(Y;A) has the stated properties and will
want to strictly favor early applicants if a uniform admissions policy that meets the yield
requirement leads to early and late matriculants. Q.E.D.
5. Suppose student behavior is "-perturbed. For su¢ ciently small ", properties (1)-(4)
above all hold. Furthermore ￿(Y;B;") and ￿(Y;A;") are upper semi-continuous in "
and for " > 0, single-valued with strict preference for early applicants.
21Such a value always exists because a uniform threshold of v results in no students and dropping the
threshold increases enrollment to an amount strictly greater than K at v. We assume for convenience that
the same is true for B (if B cannot always meet its yield target, a few small modi￿cations are needed in the
proof but our results still hold).
26Proof. The ￿rst three properties above follow from the same arguments. For small ",
each school will still prefer to admit higher v students and prefer early to regular applicants.
For the last part, consider the construction of optimal policies in the proof of Claim 4. For
" > 0, the uniform admissions policy leads to both early and late matriculants, so any
optimal policy must involve strictly favoring early applicants and in fact the optimal policy
is unique. That ￿;￿ are usc in " again follows from Berge￿ s Theorem. Q.E.D.
Properties of Student Best Responses
1. Suppose both schools strictly favor early applicants. If AEA ￿ BEA, any student with
y ￿ 0 should apply early to A. If AEA > BEA, a student should apply early to A if
y ￿ Y (w) and otherwise to B, where Y (w) is strictly positive and decreasing in w.
Proof. If a student prefers a school and it has the lower early threshold, it￿ s optimal to
apply early to that school because for any realization of v applying early to the other school
can only lead to worse outcomes. For the last claim, suppose AEA > BEA. It is optimal to







The second term is strictly increasing in y and equal to zero at y = 0. The ￿rst term is
strictly positive and weakly increasing in y by a¢ liation. So the student optimally uses a
cut-o⁄rule: apply early to A if and only if y ￿ Y (w), where Y (w) > 0. Moreover, if w takes
multiple values, the ￿rst term is increasing in w by a¢ liation, so Y (w) is decreasing.Q.E.D.
2. Suppose the schools use thresholds that weakly favor early applicants, and that stu-
dents are constrained to apply early to B if y < 0. Then there is some threshold policy
that is optimal for students with y ￿ 0. Let ￿(A;B) denote the set of threshold poli-
cies, nonincreasing in w, that are optimal subject to the constraint that all students
with y < 0 apply early to B. Then ￿ is non-empty, convex-valued and usc in A;B.
Proof. If neither school strictly favors early applicants, any early application behavior
is optimal including all threshold rules, with Y (w) ￿ 0 and nonincreasing in w. If only
one school strictly favors early applicants, it is optimal to apply early to that school to the
extent possible, again implying a threshold policy (either Y (w) = y or Y (w) = 0 given the
constraint). If both schools favor early applicants and AEA ￿ BEA, then Y (w) = 0 is optimal
given the constraint. Finally, if both favor early applicants and AEA > BEA, then there is
a uniquely optimal threshold rule Y (w) > 0 as described above. From this characterization,
it is straightforward to check that ￿ has the claimed properties. Q.E.D.
Robust Threshold Equilibria
1. Suppose student behavior is "-perturbed, for su¢ ciently small " > 0. At least one
threshold equilibrium exists, and any threshold equilibrium involves BEA < BRA,
BEA < AEA < ARA, and either Y > 0 or if students have a signal of ability, Y (w)
strictly positive and decreasing in w.
27Proof. Consider the case with a w signal. Let A denote the set of possible admission
thresholds AEA;ARA with AEA ￿ ARA, and similarly de￿ne B. Let Y denote the set of
application thresholds Y (w), with Y (w) ￿ 0 and nonincreasing in w. De￿ne the set-valued
function:
T(A;B;Y ;") = (￿(B;Y ;");￿(A;Y ;");￿(A;B)).
This correspondence maps A ￿ B ￿ Y into itself. For su¢ ciently small " > 0 satis￿es all
the requirements of the Glicksberg-Fan version of Kakutani￿ s Fixed Point Theorem. Let
A(");B(");Y (") denote a ￿xed point.
We claim these strategies are an equilibrium, and satisfy the stated properties. By
de￿nition A(");B(") are optimal for the schools, and from Claim 5 above, A and B must
strictly favor early applicants. Moreover, we must have BEA < AEA. If instead AEA ￿ BEA,
any student with y > 0 that behaves optimally will enroll at A with at least probability
1 ￿ " whenever v ￿ AEA. So A￿ s yield constraint implies that AEA > V , which in turn
implies that less than 2K students are admitted to a selective school, violating optimality
for the schools. Finally given that both A and B favor early applicants and BEA < AEA,
it is strictly optimal for all students with y ￿ 0 to apply early to B. Therefore Y (") is the
unique best-response for students even if we remove the constraints imposed in de￿ning ￿.
Furthermore Y (w;") > 0. Q.E.D.
2. There is always a robust threshold equilibrium of the unperturbed model, and any such
equilibrium (a) students use a strictly positive threshold Y > 0 or if they have a w
signal, a strictly positive and decreasing threshold Y (w); (b) schools thresholds satisfy
BEA < BRA and BEA < AEA < ARA; and (c) early yields exceed regular yields.
Proof. Existence follows from the continuity properties established above. Consider a
sequence of strategies A(");B(");Y (") where for each " > 0, the pro￿le A(");B(");Y (") is
an equilibrium. They must have a convergence subsequence because A ￿ B ￿ Y is compact.
Moreover, if the limit A;B;Y were not an equilibrium some party can do strictly better
with an alternative strategy. But that same strategy, say A0, will be preferred to A(") as a
response to B(");Y (") for su¢ ciently small ", a contradiction.
We now establish necessary properties of a robust threshold equilibrium Y (w); AEA; ARA;
BEA; BRA.
First, AEA ￿ ARA, BEA ￿ BRA and Y (w) ￿ 0, or else the equilibrium cannot be the
limit of "-perturbed equilibria.
Second, BEA < AEA. If instead AEA ￿ BEA, then any student with y ￿ 0 who behaves
optimally will enroll in A if v ￿ AEA. So V < AEA ￿ BEA;BRA;ARA and hence less than
2K students are admitted in total to A and B violating the yield constraints.
Third, if A receives no early applications, i.e. Y (w) = Y , its optimal policy must satisfy
￿A(AEA;Y ) = Ey[￿A (ARA;y)jy ￿ 0], and in particular AEA < ARA. This follows because
A￿ s optimal policy must be the limit of optimal policies where A receives early applications
from a vanishingly small fraction of students who prefer it most, and this limit must involve
indi⁄erence (as opposed to AEA = v) because AEA > V .
Fourth, BEA < BRA. Suppose to the contrary that BEA = BRA. Because Y (w) ￿ 0,
B must receive early applicants, and some will enroll. If in addition B receives regular
28applications, some must subsequently enroll because BRA = BEA < AEA. But that would
mean a uniform threshold could not be optimal. So the only way that BEA = BRA could
be optimal is if all students apply early to B. If that is so, however, then AEA < ARA from
above, and we arrive at another contradiction to optimality because students with y > 0
would apply to A early if A but not B strictly favored early applicants.
Fifth, Y (w) > 0. This follows because B strictly favors early applicants and uses a strictly
lower threshold than A for early applicants.
Sixth, AEA < ARA. We have already established this to be the case if A receives no
early applications, and if it receives early applications it must matriculate some of them.
Moreover, because Y (w) > 0 it must matriculate some of its regular applicants if it uses a
uniform threshold. So from (5) above, it must be the case that AEA < ARA.
The last property is that early yields exceed regular yields. This is clearly true for A,
which enrolls all early admits. For B, it can be seen immediately in Figure 2, and the
other cases are that either no students apply regular, which makes the claim trivial, or that
BRA > AEA so that the regular yield is zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
The argument is essentially the same as for Propositions 2 and 4, so we provide only a
sketch. First, it is easy to verify that optimal admissions and application behavior has the
same properties described above. Schools can optimally use threshold rules in response to
threshold rules and want to strictly favor early applicants if they get matriculants from both
pools. If the schools strictly favor early applicants and BED < AED, it is optimal for students
to use a threshold policy with Y > 0. The existence of a robust threshold equilibrium follows
from the same arguments made in the Early Action case.
Consider properties of a robust equilibrium. As above, we must have AED ￿ ARD,
BED ￿ BRD and Y ￿ 0. Similarly, we must have BED < AED to satisfy the yield constraints.
It must also be the case that BED < BRD. The only way this could not happen is if all
students were applying early to B, in which case the yield constraints would imply that
BED > ARD ￿ AED violating the previous condition. So BEA < BRA and BEA < AED and
it follows that students must use a threshold Y > 0. Finally AED = ARD is optimal for A
but inconsistent with A￿ s thresholds being nearly optimal for small perturbations in student
application behavior along the lines above. So AED < ARD. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
The following example shows that preference toward Early Decision are sensitive to parame-
ters. Suppose v;y are independently distributed, with v uniform on [0;1], and y taking values
￿;2=3; and 1, with probabilities 1=4;1=4 and 1=2, where ￿ > 0 is very small. (The example
can be extended to match our continuous model; having three types simpli￿es calculations.)
School preferences are ￿A(v;y) = v+￿y and ￿B(v;y) = v￿￿y, with ￿ 2 (0;3K=2). Student
preferences satisfy u(A;y)=u(B;y) > 2 for y = 1, and 1+(2=3)(￿=K) < u(A;y)=u(B;y) < 2
for y = 2=3.
Regular Admissions. Students with abilities between 1￿K and 1 enroll at A, and students
29with abilities between 1 ￿ 2K and 1 ￿ K enroll at B. The average y of students at A and B
is the same, 2/3. So A￿ s payo⁄is 1￿(1=2)K +(2=3)￿ and B￿ s payo⁄is 1￿(3=2)K ￿(2=3)￿.
Early Action. There is an equilibrium in which students with y = 1 apply early to A and the
others apply early to B, and schools use thresholds AEA = 1￿K ￿￿=3, ARA = 1￿K +￿=3,
and BEA = 1￿2K￿￿=3 and BRA = 1￿2K+￿=3. For school A, the marginal early and regular
enrollee have expected y￿ s of 1 and 1=3, making it optimal to set ARA ￿AEA = (2=3)￿, and
satisfy its yield constraint. A similar calculation applies for B. For students, applying early
to A rather than B has a bene￿t of (2￿=3)[u(A;y)￿u(B;y)] and a cost of (2￿=3)u(B;y), so
student behavior is also optimal. In equilibrium, school A enrolls K=2+￿=6 early applicants
with an average ability of 1￿(1=2)K￿￿=6, and y = 1, and an K=2￿￿=6 regular applicants
with average ability 1 ￿ (1=2)K + ￿=6 and an average y of 1=3. So its equilibrium payo⁄
is 1 ￿ (1=2)K + (2=3)￿ + ￿2=(18K). A similar calculation shows that school B￿ s payo⁄ is
1 ￿ (3=2)K ￿ (2=3)￿ + ￿2=(18K).
Early Decision. With early decision, there is an equilibrium in which students with y = 2=3
and y = 1 apply early to A, and students with y = 0 apply early to B, and the schools use
thresholds AED = 1￿(4=3)K and ARD = 1￿(4=3)K+(2=9)￿, and BED = 1￿2K￿(2=3)￿,
BRD = 1￿2K +(2=9)￿. School A￿ s early threshold just satis￿es its yield constraint, and its
regular constraint is pinned down by the robustness requirement that ARD ￿ARD = (2=9)￿.
For school B, BRD ￿ BED = (8=9)￿, so B is just indi⁄erent between marginal early and
late enrollees, and its yield constraint is just satis￿ed. For students, applying early to
A rather than B increases payo⁄ has a bene￿t of (4=3)K[u(A;y) ￿ u(B;y)] and a cost
of (8=9)￿u(B;y), and so our assumptions about student preferences imply that student
behavior is also optimal. The equilibrium payo⁄s can be derived as follows. School A gets
an average quality of 1 ￿ (2=3)K and student taste of 8=9, so its payo⁄ is 1 ￿ (2=3)K +
(8=9)￿. School B admits a fraction 1=2 + (1=6)(￿=K) of its class early with average quality
1 ￿ K ￿ (1=3)￿ and y = 0; the remainder of its class arrives regular with average quality
1 ￿ (5=3)K + (1=9)￿ and taste 8=9. So its payo⁄ is 1 ￿ (4=3)K ￿ (4=9)￿ + (2=27)(￿2=K).
Preferences of Schools. For school A, Early Decision produces an entering class with
lowest average ability but the best preference match. School A prefers Early Decision to
Regular Admissions if and only if ￿ ￿ (3=4)K, and Early Decision to Early Action if and
only if ￿ ￿ (3=4)K + (1=4)(￿2=K). These inequalities can go either way.
With the given probability distribution for y, B prefers Early Decision to Early Action
for any ￿. However, if we change the probability distribution for y slightly to P(y = 1) =
1=2, P(y = 2=3) = 1=2 ￿ p;P(y = 0) = p, then for small values of p,(in combination
with additional assumptions about u(A;y);u(B;y) to ensure that the student strategies
described above remain optimal), the Early Decision equilibrium produces approximately
the same assignment of students and same utilities for colleges as in the Regular Admissions
equilibrium, whereas Early Action produces a distinct gain in utilities for the colleges. Under
















Boston College 190 51 71% 35% N/A
Brown 509 219 38% 17% 24%
Cal. Tech 65 30 34% 18% 23%
Georgetown 247 100 53% 23% 23%
Harvard 573 314 28% 11% 26%
M.I.T. 214 97 39% 19% 23%
U. Chicago 160 49 79% 48% 57%
Notre Dame 82 30 63% 35% 52%
Amherst 174 24 47% 19% 35%
Columbia 320 44 40% 14% 37%
Cornell 326 32 57% 33% N/A
Dartmouth 256 42 41% 21% 33%
Duke 350 40 42% 28% 41%
Middlebury 133 16 56% 26% 33%
N.Y.U. 230 17 76% 32% 33%
Northwestern 275 21 68% 32% 57%
Penn 400 62 48% 26% 46%
Princeton 359 70 28% 11% 31%
Stanford 464 74 34% 15% 24%
Swarthmore 107 11 49% N/A N/A
Tufts 307 25 49% 32% 43%
U. Virginia 239 23 70% 34% 42%
Vassar 123 11 65% 43% 57%
Washington U. 306 15 79% 34% 35%
Wellesley 59 12 75% 34% 67%
Wesleyan 163 13 54% N/A N/A
Williams 168 24 41% 23% 39%
Yale 444 102 33% 16% 36%
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Survey Colleges
Early Decision Schools
Early Action Schools
*  Overall rates of admission are given for 1998-1999, as reported by US News. We 
believe that early applicants who were deferred and subsequently admitted are not 


















Boston College Early 1334 2.67 2.56 N/A 77% 77%
Regular 1327 2.38 2.44 35% 68% 77%
Brown Early 1432 2.89 2.58 24% 52% 45%
Regular 1410 2.70 2.46 17% 27% 25%
Georgetown Early 1399 2.85 2.61 23% 61% 68%
Regular 1388 2.73 2.62 23% 47% 44%
Harvard Early 1483 3.05 2.76 26% 40% 29%
Regular 1440 2.66 2.51 11% 14% 11%
M.I.T. Early 1471 2.73 2.64 23% 47% 31%
Regular 1450 2.89 2.58 19% 31% 25%
U. Chicago Early 1423 2.82 2.61 57% 84% 98%
Regular 1450 2.77 2.49 48% 78% 92%
Columbia Early 1407 2.73 2.48 37% 73% 85%
Regular 1420 2.63 2.55 14% 34% 25%
Cornell Early 1344 2.66 2.41 N/A 66% 81%
Regular 1407 2.56 2.49 33% 56% 56%
Dartmouth Early 1391 3.02 2.63 33% 50% 59%
Regular 1419 2.64 2.57 21% 39% 28%
Duke Early 1381 2.90 2.44 41% 55% 81%
Regular 1419 2.70 2.59 28% 46% 44%
Penn Early 1391 2.87 2.41 46% 74% 84%
Regular 1410 2.70 2.48 26% 43% 39%
Princeton Early 1447 2.69 2.75 31% 57% 68%
Regular 1462 2.75 2.67 11% 20% 10%
Stanford Early 1466 2.43 2.62 24% 50% 45%
Regular 1448 2.82 2.60 15% 31% 23%
Yale Early 1474 3.41 2.59 36% 57% 44%
Regular 1453 2.80 2.67 16% 25% 18%
Early Decision Schools
* The conditional admit rates are obtained by running probit admission regressions on the sample of applicants to 
each college. The conditional admit rates are the predicted probability of admission for an applicant with mean 
characteristics in the survey data, applying early and regular to the school. The same probit specification was used 
for each college, and includes as controls: SAT scores, rating of high school quality, rating of reported activities, and 
dummy variables for race (Asian, Asian American, Black, Hispanic, Other), family connections (alumni child, 
sibling attended given college), and indicators for athletic recruit, male, private school student, financial aid 
applicant, applying from high school in the same state as the college, and having at least one parent attend graduate 
school.
Table 2: Applicant Characteristics and Admit Rates (Survey Data)








Boston College 95 39 20% 28%
Brown 79 113 38% 55%
Cal. Tech 8 14 25% 64%
Georgetown 69 61 32% 46%
Harvard 35 127 43% 85%
M.I.T. 36 46 31% 63%
U. Chicago 86 41 17% 29%
Notre Dame 31 21 45% 52%
20 ED Colleges 2039 425 29% 97%
Table 3: College Yield Rates (Survey Data)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.21
(7.35) (7.36) (6.54) (6.48) (5.57) (5.57) (5.11)
0.29 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.33
(12.09) (12.30) (12.13) (12.45) (11.24) (11.21) (9.90)
0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19
(7.46) (8.32) (8.14) (8.25) (7.40) (7.24) (6.43)
0.13 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.21
(5.66) (7.99) (7.54) (7.24) (6.64) (7.81) (6.56)
0.08 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.10
(4.59) (5.41) (5.33) (6.38) (5.60) (6.46) (3.60)
0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.03
(2.64) (3.22) (3.16) (3.18) (2.04) (2.70) (0.76)
0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09
(2.96) (3.35) (3.12) (4.09) (3.82) (3.82) (2.85)
0.16 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.20
(7.39) (6.78) (6.57) (7.11) (6.21) (6.20) (5.60)
-0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(1.54) (1.39) (1.23) (0.96) (0.88) (0.41) (0.31)
0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(2.93) (1.46) (1.09) (0.37) (0.41) (0.51) (0.66)
0.087 0.075 0.07 0.075 0.086 0.062
(4.71) (4.06) (3.68) (3.65) (3.47) (2.07)
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(4.17) (3.81) (3.31) (3.67) (2.81)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
(1.65) (0.84) (1.01) (2.51)
College Dummy Variables  XXXXXXX
Institutional Priority Variables XXXXXX
State Dummies XXXX
HS Dummies X
HS Comparison Variables X X
Early Apps included as Regular XXXXXX
Pseudo-R2 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.37 0.32
Observations 6,495 6,495 6,218 6,218 5,097 5,053 3,022
Table 4: Probit Estimates of Admissions Probability 
Student Activity Rating 
Financial Aid Applicant
Private School
High School Quality Rating
Notes: (1) Coefficients are reported as marginal effects on the probability of acceptance at sample means; (2) T-statistics are 
in parentheses; standard errors were adjusted to account for correlation across multiple applications by each student; (3) SAT 
scores are in hundreds of points; (4) Institutional priority variables include five dummy variables for race, two dummy 
variables for alumni child status, and a dummy variable for athletic recruits; (5) High school comparison variables control for 
the average SAT score and the number of AP courses taken by other participants in the study from the same high school: 
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Figure 4: Early Decision Equilibrium
ARD